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Abstract: Evil in Modern Thought, Susan Neiman's account of the 
intellectual trajectory of modernity, employs the trope “homeless” to 
articulate deep difficulties that affirmations of divine transcendence and of 
human capacities to acknowledge transcendence face in a contemporary 
context thoroughly marked by fragmentation, fragility, and contingency. The 
“hospitality” of the Incarnation, which makes a fractured world a place for 
divine welcoming of the human in all its contingency and brokenness, is 
proposed as locus for theological engagement with Neiman's appropriation of 
a Kantian sense of hope as the readiness to resist evil in a world seemingly 
bereft of welcome. 
The fact that the world contains neither justice nor meaning 
threatens our ability both to act in the world and to understand it.1 
We proceed on the assumption that the true and the good, and 
just possibly the beautiful, coincide. Where they do not, we demand an 
account. The urge to unite is and ought stands behind every creative 
endeavor. Those who seek to unite them by force usually do more 
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harm than they set out to prevent. Those who never seek to unite 
them do nothing at all.2 
. . . the modern world shows itself at once powerful and weak, 
capable of the noblest deeds or the foulest; before it lies the path to 
freedom or to slavery, to progress or retreat, to brotherhood or 
hatred. Moreover, man is becoming aware that it is his responsibility 
to guide aright the forces which he has unleashed and which can 
enslave him or minister to him. That is why he is putting questions to 
himself.3 
I. Evil: The Fractured Landscape of Modern 
Philosophy 
Written in stunningly elegant prose, Susan Neiman's Evil in 
Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy makes a 
provocative case for two theses that I believe merit careful attention in 
efforts to read “the signs of the times” in hope of rendering 
theologically intelligible the cultures of modernity and their aftermath. 
The first thesis makes a claim about the fundamental intellectual 
trajectory of modernity that disputes the “picture of modern 
philosophy as centered in epistemology and driven by the desire to 
ground our representations”.4 In place of this standard narrative of a 
philosophical quest for foundations on which to rest cognitive 
certainty, Neiman proposes that “the problem of evil is the guiding 
force of modern thought”.5 She argues that “as an organizing principle 
for the history of philosophy, the problem of evil is better than 
alternatives. It is more inclusive, comprehending a greater number of 
texts; more faithful to their authors' stated intentions; and more 
interesting.”6 Her second thesis then articulates what gives the 
problem of evil its conceptual and practical “traction”—i.e., what 
makes our grappling with evil the point at which “ethics and 
metaphysics, epistemology and aesthetics meet, collide and throw up 
their hands”.7 Neiman's thesis here—not a modest one—is that “[a]t 
issue [in the problem of evil] are questions about what the world must 
be like for us to think and act within it8. . . . it is fundamentally a 
problem about the intelligibility of the world as a whole.”9 Not only is 
she straightforward about the ineluctably metaphysical character of 
the problem of evil—“when the world is not as it should be, we begin is 
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ask why”;10 she goes so far as to describe metaphysics as 
fundamentally indexed to the problem of evil: It is “the drive to make 
very general sense of the world in the face of the fact that things go 
intolerably wrong”.11 
Neiman builds the case for the first thesis on an astute 
remapping of texts from Leibniz to Rawls. In place of terrain 
traditionally apportioned among rationalists and empiricists on the 
farther side of the Kantian critical divide, with the major post-Kantian 
settlements eventually deployed into foundationalist and anti-
foundationalist camps, she offers a line of demarcation traced by 
reference to the problem of evil along which to place philosophers of 
the modern and nascent post-modern eras.12 On one side are those for 
whom “morality demands that we make evil fully intelligible”;13 
Leibniz, Pope, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx stand here. On the 
other side are “those for whom morality demands that we don't”;14 
here stand Bayle, Voltaire, Hume, Sade, and Schopenhauer. She 
recognizes that there are important figures—notably Nietzsche and 
Freud—who don't neatly fall in place on either side of this line. 
Nietzsche, on his part, shows a stubborn allegiance to both camps,15 
while Freud denies the distinction between natural and moral evil, 
which took firm hold on the intellectual terrain in the aftermath of the 
Enlightenment's paradigm marker of evil, the Lisbon earthquake of 
1755.16 Neiman argues that our own contemporary paradigm marker 
of evil, Auschwitz, has fully shattered not only this distinction—which 
provided much of the energy for modern religious and secular 
theodicies—but all other conceptual resources deployed for dealing 
with evil since the Enlightenment.17 Following Levinas, she argues that 
“Auschwitz destroyed two central responses to evil that can be viewed 
as secular theodicies.”18 The first response (Hegel's) “sought to 
redeem particular evils by placing them in history”; the second 
(Nietzsche's) “argued that the problem of evil is our own creation”.19 
Yet overturning Hegel and Nietzsche provides little comfort for 
those who may have thought that placing the full responsibility for evil 
on human intent had decisively banished theodicy: “Auschwitz [also] 
undermined the modern rejection of theodicy that locates evil in 
intention.”20 In short, even as “Auschwitz threatens to undermine the 
modern determination to live without theodicy . . . it devastated 
modern attempts to replace it”.21 Neiman's account of philosophy 
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undertaken in the shadow of Auschwitz is thus cast in terms of a 
reflection on the claim made by Levinas that “[p]erhaps the most 
revolutionary fact of the twentieth century consciousness . . . is the 
destruction of all balance between explicit and implicit theodicy of 
Western thought”.22 She seeks to construe this claim in the light the 
fact that “elements of traditional discussion of the problem of evil have 
reemerged in response to Asuchwitz”.23 She thus offers a sketch of the 
efforts of thinkers she considers representative of post World War II 
philosophy—Camus, Arendt, Adorno and Horkheiemer, and Rawls—to 
grapple with questions of evil even though they do so “in painful 
awareness that even the attempt to voice them may be problematic”.24 
In her narration of this “alternative history”, Neiman is candid 
that her sympathy lies with those who take morality to demand that 
we persist in efforts to make evil intelligible rather than acquiesce in 
its unintelligibility. In professed alliance with Kant, she locates this 
moral demand for making evil intelligible as a function of our 
rationality. Making sense of the world—even when it resists our 
efforts—is fundamental for our human dealings with the world. “We 
are so structured as to expect a world that comes to meet us halfway, 
for we cannot make meaning alone. . . . Belief that there may be 
reason in the world is a condition of possibility of our being able to go 
on in it.”25 In the face of this tenacious demand on our part for 
intelligibility, evil (as Dostoevsky recognized) “is not just one more 
mystery. It is so central to our lives that if reason stumbles there, it 
must give way to faith.”26 At stake in efforts to contend with and 
comprehend evil is the integrity of the demand for intelligible meaning 
that powers human inquiry: “The smaller the expectations of the 
rational, the less it demands of the real. Where reason's demands are 
too humble, it concedes all the terms to reality before the struggle 
begins.”27 Of greater significance is the fact that the integrity of efforts 
to resist evil also is at stake: “To abandon the effort to comprehend 
evil is to abandon every basis for confronting it, in thought as in 
practice. . . . Belief that the world should be rational is the basis of 
every attempt to make it so. . . . Without such a demand, we would 
never feel outrage—nor assume the responsibility for change to which 
outrage sometimes leads.”28 
Much useful discussion could ensue from placing Neiman's larger 
mapping of modernity and its aftermath—as well as her location of 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Modern Theology, Vol 23, No. 1 (January 2007): pg. 47-61. DOI. This article is © Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. 
5 
 
Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, et al., within it—in 
conversation with other accounts that theologians have been using (or 
disputing) in efforts to limn the contours of the intellectual and cultural 
dynamics of the last three centuries of modernity. My hunch is that 
engaging her work with that of Charles Taylor, Michael Buckley, 
George Steiner and Louis Dupré, who, like her, acknowledge and 
appreciate the achievements of a modernity whose flaws they do not 
hesitate to name and criticize, could provide an especially productive 
interchange. That project, however, is well beyond the more limited 
scope of this essay, which is to initiate a theological engagement with 
her second thesis and its provocative articulation of the intellectual 
and moral dynamics that place the question of evil at the center of 
modern philosophical inquiry. This thesis takes evil to bring into 
fundamental question the unbreakable connection that our human 
efforts to make sense of the world forge with our hope of being at 
home in the world. As she puts this point in more abstract terms, 
“ethics and metaphysics are not accidentally connected. Whatever 
attempts we make to live rightly are attempts to live in the world.”29 
The connection between “making sense of the world” and the 
hope it elicits for “being at home in the world” thus provides an initial 
locus for conversation with Neiman's thesis. This connection is at the 
root of her explicit displacement of “theodicy”—construed as “justifying 
God”—from the center of discussion of the problem of evil, and its 
replacement by the “principle of sufficient reason”—construed as a 
“question of intelligibility: Are our capacities to find and create 
meaning in a world adequate to a world that seems determined to 
thwart them?”30 My interest in this dimension of her thesis is not 
primarily in her treatment of theodicy as a (distinctively) modern 
enterprise, even though the details of her discussion add further 
weight to a general claim about the “end of theodicy” for which others 
have already built a strong case.31 My main interest, rather, is in her 
description and assessment of “the impulse to theodicy”,32 which she 
had earlier described as “the need to face evil in the world without 
giving in to despair”.33 She claims that “the impulse to theodicy is not 
a relic of monotheism, but goes deeper than either”; that in this 
impulse “something beside God is at issue”; that the source of this 
impulse is “something deeper than religion”.34 It is “deeper than 
religion” inasmuch as this impulse lies in something about the 
structure of what makes us human from which religion—but not only 
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religion—arises: “the drive to seek reason in the world—even, or 
especially, at the points where it seems most absent—is as deep a 
drive as any we have”.35 
Neiman's reading of the principle of sufficient reason that drives 
the impulse to metaphysics—and, with it, the impulse to theodicy—is, 
as she readily admits, an articulation of her understanding of Kant's 
account of reason. She takes the principle of sufficient reason to 
“express the belief that we can find a reason for everything that the 
world presents” and calls it a “regulative principle . . . a drive essential 
to reason itself”.36 Of equal significance is the fact that she sees the 
dynamism of this principle functioning in terms of reason's capacity for 
setting ends in the world, which “is a matter of seeking, and creating, 
what is good in itself”.37 From this she concludes that what “Kant 
implied, but never actually stated, behind the principle of sufficient 
reason itself is the assumption that the is and the ought should 
coincide. The principle of sufficient reason starts its work where they 
fail to meet.”38 More so than many Kant scholars of a previous 
generation, Neiman gives full weight to Kant's claim that there is a 
unity to the theoretical and practical uses of reason and to his 
assignment of primacy to its practical (moral) use.39 In so doing, she 
inverts two dominant philosophical stances of the twentieth century: 
The eschewal of metaphysics and the separation of metaphysics from 
ethics. She affirms, in contrast, that philosophy must engage 
metaphysical questions and that the most important question of all, 
the question of evil, is precisely where metaphysics and ethics 
ineluctably connect: “The problem of evil can be expressed in 
theological or secular terms, but it is fundamentally a problem about 
the intelligibility of the world as a whole. Thus it belongs neither to 
ethics nor to metaphysics but forms a link between the two.”40 
II. Theology: Fractured Vistas upon a Fractured 
Landscape? 
Against this background, one possible way for a Catholic 
theology to read Neiman's claims about the tenacious human demand 
for making sense of the world would be to engage it with the claims 
about human intellectual dynamism that have been advanced in the 
tradition of transcendental Thomism. That dynamism, identified as a 
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“drive toward being” that is a fundamental marker of the spiritual 
dimension of our human reality, serves as a crucial conceptual grid 
from which transcendental Thomism sought to align what otherwise 
appear to be quite disparate Augustinian, Thomist and Kantian 
accounts of human cognitive capacities and structures. This kind of 
engagement with Neiman's robust account of the regulative function of 
reason in the human quest for making sense of the world in which we 
must live, might open new lines of useful conversation on a 
fundamental anthropological question that need to be faced in the 
aftermath of modernity: What gives us warrant to speak of the human 
as “spiritual”?41 
As helpful and as important as that conversation might be, 
however, I think a more urgent and challenging locus for discussion 
lies in engaging her account of the conceptual and cultural contexts in 
which the “impulse to metaphysics” now functions, and upon which 
any effort to make sense of the world in the hope of being at home in 
the world now must bear. I believe this discussion has more urgency 
because her account of this context articulates deep difficulties that 
affirmations of divine transcendence and of corresponding human 
capacities to acknowledge that transcendence need to face in a 
contemporary human context that is so thoroughly marked by the 
fragmentation, fragility, and contingency she poignantly describes. As 
I will suggest in the final section of this essay, the very fractured and 
fragile character that she takes to mark our human finitude may offer 
a particularly apt locus for a post-modern theological re-appropriation 
of the scope and import of God's incarnate engagement with the 
human. 
Two passages from the concluding paragraphs of Evil in Modern 
Thought—along with the title of the final chapter, “Homeless”—can 
serve as appropriate points of reference for opening this line of 
discussion: 
If the events that determined the twentieth century left 
contemporary experience fractured, any conception of reason 
that can be salvaged must reflect fracture itself. . . . What binds 
the real and the rational together must be so fragile that it will 
seem miraculous—and on occasion the miracle occurs. As with 
any other miracle, it takes something like faith to perceive it.42 
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If I am reading Neiman correctly, the landscape of a post-Auschwitz 
world presents itself as bleak, stark and abidingly fragmented. Not 
only do we live and act in a world of nature that we have fully 
disenchanted of purposes that pay special attention to humanity; we 
live and act in a world in which we have become acutely aware of how 
thoroughly capable we have become of disenchanting and disengaging 
ourselves from attention to our own humanity. It is not just the 
landscape in which we find ourselves that has fragmented; something 
fundamental about ourselves, in ourselves, has deeply fractured. She 
notes that “Auschwitz revealed the remoteness of humans from 
themselves”43 and later adds that “Auschwitz was conceptually 
devastating because it revealed a possibility in human nature that we 
hoped not to see”.44 This possibility is one that Hannah Arendt sought 
to capture in her phrase “the banality of evil”, which Neiman—in 
defending it against critics of Arendt—sees as bearing the profoundly 
unsettling insight that “[I]n contemporary evil, individuals' intentions 
rarely correspond to the magnitude of evil individuals are able to 
cause.”45 
These remarks, offered in the context of her discussion of the 
“devastation” of our conceptual resources for dealing with evil in the 
aftermath of Auschwitz, are ones that I propose that we read in the 
light of what she articulates in the introduction as one guiding interest 
for her inquiry: 
Since I do not think an intrinsic property of evil can be defined, I 
am, rather, concerned with tracing what evil does to us. If 
designating something as evil is a way of marking the fact that 
it shatters our trust in the world, it's that effect, rather than the 
cause, which I want to examine. It should follow that I have 
even less intention of solving the problem of evil than I do of 
defining evil itself. My interest is, rather, to explore what 
changes in our understanding of the problem of evil reveal 
about changes in our understanding of ourselves, and of our 
place in the world.46[Emphasis mine.] 
Out of philosophical texts from Bayle to Rawls, Neiman has pieced 
together a complex mosaic of changes that have taken place in how 
Western intellectual culture has understood the problem of evil. 
Embedded within that mosaic—though not always as strongly 
highlighted—are changes she sees correlatively taking place in the 
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understanding of ourselves. In hope of gaining clarity on the latter 
changes, even at the risk of reducing her mosaic to a cartoon outline, I 
propose making just one of the former changes a focus of attention. 
This change—which is no small one—displaced God from the center of 
efforts to render evil intelligible and it put humanity in God's stead. 
“The problem of evil began by trying to penetrate God's intentions. 
Now it appears that we cannot make sense of our own.”47 What started 
out as the audacity of Kant's categorical imperative of universalizing 
maxims by imagining ourselves as creators of a law of nature—“the 
fantasy of replacing God is the test by which morality is decided”48—
has ended with the disorientation attendant upon our moral 
helplessness in the face of the evil marked by Auschwitz: “the forms of 
evil that appeared in the twentieth century made demands modern 
consciousness could not meet.”49 
What drove attempts to render evil intelligible from a probing of 
God's purposes to a shattering of our own? Neiman traces its sources 
back to the interplay of two key distinctions: the first is that between 
creation and the creator; the second is that between natural evil and 
moral evil. The project of theodicy as a defense of God's purposes had 
traditionally depended on being able to distinguish between the creator 
and creation—and firmly placing our capacities for understanding 
either one within the finite limits of our status as creatures. Neiman 
argues that, prior to Lisbon, the way this first distinction had been 
embedded in the pre-modern world view posed no significant threat to 
affirmations of the goodness of either the creator or creation; on the 
contrary, “[o]ur lack of understanding of why the gods struck can be 
one more sign of the distance between the human and the divine that 
moves some souls to reverence.”50 After Lisbon (and following 
Rousseau), however, theodicy offered in defense of the goodness of 
the creator—as well as much of the criticism of such a defense—could 
continue only as it also engaged the further distinction between 
natural evil and moral evil that offered “two messages: we should 
worry about the evils for which we are responsible and God will take 
care of the rest”.51 
Both distinctions, however, became more problematic for both 
defenders and opponents of the theodicy as that project moved 
through the nineteenth century: A God whose relation to creation is 
either withdrawn into the remoteness of general Providence or 
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immanentized into the dialectic of history comes, in the end, to be 
little different from a God dethroned by a Promethean humanity. 
Comprehending evil in a creation without God might thus seem a 
simpler problem, but it has proved no less intractable in the wake of 
the breakdown of the distinction between natural and moral evils. In a 
world in which scientific inquiries have disenchanted us from seeing 
the operation of supernatural agencies, this distinction had functioned 
as the trusted conceptual tool to divide human moral responsibility for 
evil from the human misfortune that ensues in consequence of floods, 
storms, and earthquakes. Yet this disenchantment also rendered 
disastrous events in the natural world so ordinary as to be “literally 
insignificant—not representative of something besides themselves, nor 
signals we need to decode”.52 The distinction between natural evil and 
moral evil that seemingly tamed the world by voiding natural disaster 
of moral significance proved to be unstable: It is not merely the case 
that “[s]ince Lisbon, natural evils no longer have any seemly relation 
to moral evils”; it is rather that “they no longer have meaning at all”.53 
On Neiman's reading of intellectual history, Freud then provides the 
final arguments for a relentless naturalism that reveals how stripped of 
all comfort the disenchanted world must be. As she remarks at the 
conclusion of her discussion of Nietzsche and Freud, “Science may 
have abolished the sense that the world is inhabited by forces with 
wills of their own, and in this way reduced the unheimlich. But the 
price is enormous, for all nature stands condemned. Human beings 
themselves become walking indictments of creation.”54 
Much in Neiman's account of this distinction, its destabilization, 
and its relation to the distinction between creator and creation is 
worthy of extensive discussion. Constraints of space permit treatment 
of just one of its features—the one signaled in the title of her final 
chapter, “Homeless”. This title encompasses the thoroughgoing 
fragility, fragmentation, and contingency of the human that Auschwitz 
and other evils of the twentieth century have laid bare with brutal and 
ever so efficient horror. In her view, the fracturing of the distinction 
between natural and moral evil has had its most destructive impact 
upon our very efforts to make sense of the world in which those evils 
took place, and, more pointedly, to make sense of our own place in 
that world: 
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Like Lisbon, Auschwitz acquired significance in relation to the 
web of beliefs in which it occurred. What seem devastated—nay, 
entirely thwarted—by Auschwitz was the possibility of 
intellectual response itself. Thought stood still, for the tools of 
civilization seemed as hopeless in coping with the event as they 
were in preventing it.55 
Our “conceptual helplessness” is all the more devastating because it 
extends to ourselves. We find ourselves homeless in a world we had 
trusted to be fundamentally “for” us—not simply in the sense of being 
there for our use, or even there for our comfort, but in the sense of 
“meeting us halfway” by yielding meanings responsive to the deep 
longing for “making sense” that drives us. As modernity unfolded, we 
seemed to be learning how “to stop viewing the world as a home that 
a stern but indulgent parent might have built for us, and to grow up 
and build our own”.56 Athwart this confidence in our growing worldly 
adulthood, the evils we have wrought on one another since the start of 
the twentieth century have deeply undercut whatever previous trust 
we had in ourselves to be “builders” of a home in the world. Neiman 
contends that instances of “single-mindedly thoughtful evil”57—such as 
terrorism—have not been the factors most corrosive of this trust. Far 
more devastating have been the routines of thoughtlessness and 
inattention that allow massive evil to be done by “ordinary people who 
do not let themselves acknowledge, exactly, what it is they do”.58 She 
hews close to her Kantian heritage in marking the opacity of our moral 
self-knowledge, even as she indicates that Kant hardly foresaw in such 
opacity the insidious power of the banality of evil: “[i]n contemporary 
evil, individuals' intentions rarely correspond to the magnitude of evil 
individuals are able to cause”.59 
As I understand Neiman's account, however, contemporary 
forms of evil have not themselves rendered us homeless; they have, 
rather, brought us to recognition of how homeless we are and how 
homeless we will continue to make ourselves—in the absence of 
resolute, unflinching resistance to evil. We may be homeless, but for 
all that we are not bereft of hope. In this, Neiman begs to differ with 
Nietzsche, for whom “[h]ope itself must be combated, since hope for 
something better condemns whatever there is”.60 Her difference from 
Nietzsche is no more pointedly affirmed than in her recurring trope of 
the child, who provides a living icon of hope: “In the child's refusal to 
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accept a world that makes no sense lies all the hope that ever makes 
us start anew.”61 In a Wittgensteinian mode, Neiman leaves unsaid 
what offers hope even as she points to acts of resistance to evil that 
instanced it. Of the passengers on Flight 93 who, “unlike the 
passengers on the other flights [on 9/11] . . . had knowledge on which 
they could act”,62 she comments: 
. . . We will never know how much destruction they prevented, 
but we know they prevented some. They proved not only that 
human beings have freedom; we can use it to affect a world we 
fear we don't control. 
This is not theodicy. It is not even consolation—though it 
is all the hope we have.63 
Where we might go theologically from where Neiman stands, I 
am not sure. We may, first of all, be reluctant even to stand where she 
does inside such a fractured landscape. We may be even more 
reluctant to stand there as the fractured selves she suggests that we 
need to acknowledge we have all become. Possibly the most 
theologically disorienting—but by that measure also the most 
theologically challenging—feature of standing with her would be taking 
seriously the prospect that all our efforts to make sense of our 
landscape are so fragile that they will only come out as fragmented as 
we are: “Where experience was truly shattered, the pieces will never 
be neatly ordered again.”64 To the extent that, as theologians, we may 
be also prone to what was “Kant's greatest error . . . to mistake the 
demand for reason with the demand for system”,65 standing with 
Neiman might be a useful exercise in theological humility. At the same 
time, Neiman would expect us to make such humility also an 
uncompromising exercise of the steadfast demand for making sense of 
the fractured pieces we see and that we are. Though it may be the 
case that “whatever sense we find must be incomplete”, that 
incompleteness is itself reason why “attention to the pieces is now all 
the more important”.66 
III. Epilogue: Incarnation as God's Hospitality 
It would be unfair to present the readers of this essay with a 
challenge to find ways to move theologically from Neiman's prospect 
on this intellectual-cultural landscape without at least suggesting some 
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of the routes that I think could be explored. I have already suggested 
that one path that lies along directions that move toward the vantage 
points from which Charles Taylor, Louis Dupré, George Steiner, and 
Michael Buckley have surveyed the landscape of modernity and its 
aftermath. They each are acutely aware that on any of the paths along 
which we head on this terrain of fractured meaning, God and humanity 
have now been mutually put in question in radical, seemingly 
unprecedented ways. They all suggest (and Neiman, Taylor and Dupré 
quite explicitly affirm) that changes in the ways that we think and 
imagine ourselves have been efficacious—they change who we are. So 
to the extent that the project of modernity has placed God and 
humanity within a fractured landscape upon which both are mutually in 
question, the changes it has wrought in how we think of and imagine 
ourselves also have had their impact on how we think of and imagine 
God—and, of comparable importance, on how we think of and imagine 
our relation to God. 
There is another important point, moreover, in which they seem 
to agree: Despite modernity's dynamic for enlarging the range of 
human instrumental control, we still cannot change ourselves into 
whatever we want without limit. We live within, and must continue to 
recognize, a fundamental recalcitrance in the contingency in the world 
and in our humanity that steadfastly resists the imperialism of 
instrumentalism. In the context of engaging the opacity of ourselves in 
the processes of history, society and culture that transform us and our 
self-understanding, these five thinkers all underscore, though in quite 
distinct ways, the fact that the relation between our opaque humanity 
and transcendence becomes unavoidably at issue. Therefore, one path 
to follow in this fractured terrain might lie along Neiman's location of 
the issue of transcendence within a relentless human determination to 
have the world make sense, even as its moral contingency eludes our 
comprehension and our control. As noted earlier, I think that along 
this path might lie useful conversation with the Augustinian dynamic of 
restless intellectual longing that was one of the engines driving 
transcendental Thomism and la nouvelle théologie. Along this way, 
Neiman's reminders about the necessity of humility and “attention to 
the pieces”67 may prove especially helpful for keeping that 
conversation mindful that it must neither bypass particularities when 
they become resistant to efforts to make sense of them, nor force 
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them to make sense by pressing them into the conceptual and 
imaginative grids with which we initially encounter them. 
From the tenor of my discussion in Part II, it should be evident 
that another related locus for theological conversation with Neiman 
that I think would be particularly fruitful to pursue lies in her depiction 
of the fragile and incomplete character of human reason's dealing with 
a fractured world and with our fractured selves in that world. What I 
find especially noteworthy for theological engagement in Neiman's 
treatment of our fractured reason is the sturdy sense of hope that 
nonetheless pervades it: Even though our efforts to make sense must 
rely upon so fragile a capacity, our very awareness of the fragility of 
reason is itself a source of hope that these efforts will not prove 
ultimately futile. Our drive to make sense may very well lie athwart 
both the workings of nature in its radical contingency with respect to 
our intents and purposes as well as athwart the opacity of our own 
moral thoughtlessness; both can undermine hope by giving us reason 
to take the contingently actual as an insurmountable obstacle to the 
morally possible. 
The sturdiness of hope in the Kantian key that Neiman plays, 
however, consists precisely in its unwillingness, in view of what ought 
to be, to settle for what is. This unwillingness is neither wish, nor 
velleity. Like Kant, her philosophical mentor, Neiman takes the 
sturdiness of hope to consist in its power to keep our action faithful to 
the moral trajectory along which we make ought become is. Kantian 
hope is thus the readiness to transform what is into what ought to 
be.68 My interest here, however, is not simply upon appropriating 
Neiman's reading of Kant as a resource for a (theological) articulation 
of the moral power of hope. I also think that her mosaic of the 
fragments of our condition might provide a starting place for looking at 
the world from—for lack of a more felicitous phrase—the “underside” 
of God's incarnation into the fractured contingency that constitutes the 
dynamics of our human world. That “underside” is the absence of 
welcome, the unavailability of hospitality, encountered by God's word 
incarnate—an unavailability marked in human terms in Luke's infancy 
narrative as “no room at the inn” and in cosmic terms in John's 
prologue as “his own received him not”. Yet this absence, 
unavailability, even refusal of welcome is met not by its counterpart, 
but by its radical inversion: The ignored, unwelcomed guest becomes 
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the welcomer, human inhospitality is reciprocated in gracious irony by 
a divine hospitality in which God makes the fractured world a place for 
divine welcoming of the human in all its contingency and brokenness. 
My suggestion, therefore, about how to move theologically from 
within Neiman's trope of homelessness is that we focus attention on 
hospitality as a key marker of how our fragmented selves may 
steadfastly enact hope for successful traverse, despite our fragility, 
across the daunting character of the broken terrain of our 
contemporary human condition. This suggestion arises, in large 
measure, from the resonances that Neiman's trope of homelessness 
has with a motif sounded by George Steiner in his accounts of the 
culture of modernity. Just as Neiman takes Kant's “metaphysic of 
permanent rupture” to demarcate a “gap between nature and freedom, 
is and ought, [that] conditions all human existence” and that also 
“means recognizing that we are never, metaphysically, at home in the 
world”,69 Steiner takes the fracturing of meaning to be the defining 
event of modernity: “[T]he break of the covenant between word and 
world which constitutes one of the very few genuine revolutions of 
spirit in Western history, and which defines modernity itself.”70 In the 
face of so deep a rupture, Steiner proposes that our engagement with 
one another, and with all that is other, on this fractured terrain 
requires more than ever before (now that we are in the “epilogue”, the 
“after-word”) a receptivity of mutually encountered freedom that he 
terms “courtesia”, or “tact of heart”, a receptivity he sees exhibited in 
“the intuition that the true reception of a guest, of a known stranger in 
our place of being touches on transcendent obligations and 
opportunities”.71 Even more to the point with respect to Neiman's 
trope of “homelessness”, he links the Jewish experience of being “an 
exile, an outsider” to the central importance he attaches to this 
fundamental enactment of receptivity in the face the whole array of 
dynamics in which humans make themselves complicit in the refusal of 
otherness: “Why have we survived? Because I believe we must teach 
other human beings to be guests of each other. . . . We must teach 
people we are guests of life on this crowded, polluted planet.”72 
What gives this path of exploration the character of a theological 
response to Neiman's depiction of the fractured terrain on which we 
must learn to be guests of one another comes, of course, in the 
recognition that the first hospitality is God's. This hospitality welcomes 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Modern Theology, Vol 23, No. 1 (January 2007): pg. 47-61. DOI. This article is © Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. 
16 
 
us in all our human fracturedness, and it is in God's welcome—enacted 
in the Word creative and incarnate—that we are empowered to 
welcome each other. To Neiman's trope of “homelessness” we can, I 
believe, appropriately add that our condition of homelessness in a 
world of fractured meaning does not leave us bereft of the gifts and 
skills of a hospitality through which the radiance of the divine 
hospitality that enables us to welcome each other can be glimpsed.73 
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